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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: VOLUNTARY
DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 41 (a) (i)
CONSIDERABLE controversy has arisen under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as to when during litigation the plaintiff loses his absolute
right to a voluntary dismissal. Rule 41 (a) (I) allows a plaintiff to
dismiss his action without court order at any time before service by
the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment.
Lower federal court decisions are in conflict over what constitutes an
answer or a motion for summary judgment under this rule. In a recent
district court decision, Tele-Views News Co. v. S.R.B. TV Publishing
Co.,1 a motion for summary judgment was construed for the purposes of
rule 41 (a) (i) to include a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.
The Tele-Views News suit was instituted originally in the Northern
District of Illinois. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under rule
12(b)(6)2 and simultaneously sought transfer to the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania.3 After the court ordered the action transferred,4
plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal with the clerk of the Illinois
court. Defendant moved to vacate plaintiff's notice of dismissal on the
ground that the motion to transfer barred subsequent voluntary dis-
missal. The Illinois district court transferred the entire record to the
district court in Pennsylvania without ruling on either defendant's
motion or on plaintiff's notice of dismissal. Prior to a decision by the
Pennsylvania district court on these issues, plaintiff instituted an
identical suit in the Southern District of Iowa.
Defendant petitioned the Pennsylvania district court to enjoin
plaintiff from proceeding with the suit brought in Iowa. Plaintiff, how-
ever, contended that the Pennsylvania district court lacked jurisdiction
to grant such an injunction, because the suit had been dismissed in
Illinois. The Pennsylvania district court ruled that it did have juris-
diction,5 and held that the filing of a motion to dismiss for failure to
a 28 F.R.D. 303 (E.D. Pa. x961).
'FED. R. Civ. P. i2(b) (6).
' Although plaintiff joined S.R.B. TV Publishing Co., Inc. and Triangle Publica-
tions, Inc. as co-defendants, only Triangle Publications, Inc. filed a motion to transfer
and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
'Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958).
Alccord, Littman v. Bache & Co., 252 F.2d 479 (zd Cir. 1958) (cited by the
court with approval). In Lttnan the court held that until the merits of the controversy
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state a claim was equivalent to a motion for summary judgment for the
purposes of applying rule 41(a) (i), thus barring plaintiff from dis-
missing without court order.6
While at common law a plaintiff had the absolute right to abandon
his action at any time before verdict, substantial inroads have been
made into this doctrine, primarily through statutory enactments." Prior
to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts
were required under the Conformity Act9 to apply a variety of state
rules governing voluntary dismissals in actions at law. In equity suits,
however, federal judges were allowed limited discretion in deciding at
which point in the proceeding plaintiff could abandon his action without
court order.10 The drafters of the Federal Rules sought to restrict
voluntary dismissal to an early stage in civil actions. Rule 41 (a) (I)
presently provides:
... [A] n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by
filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an
answer or of a motion for summary judgment, which ever first occurs.... ."
have been raised, defendant's motion to transfer does not deprive the transferring court
of jurisdiction. But see Sims v. Union News Co., 12o F. Supp. xx6 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
.In a memorandum handed down on July z, 196!, the court held that despite
defendant's prior motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, plaintiff effectively dis-
missed the action when he filed a notice of voluntary dismissal in the District Court
of Northern Illinois. After reargument on defendant's motion, the court reversed its
prior decision in a memorandum of September iS, i962, and held that defendant's
motion did preclude plaintiff from dismissing voluntarily. The issue of jurisdiction,
supra n.5, was not reconsidered in the court's second memorandum.
See Head, The History and Development of Non-SUit, 27 W. VA. L.Q. zo (1920);
Note, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 616 (x954); Note, 37 VA. L. REV. 969 (195).
8 See Annot., 89 A.L.R. 13 (1934) i Note, VA. L. REv., supra note 7.928 u-s-C. § 724 (0934).
1" "The usual ground for denying a complainant in equity the right to dismiss his
bill without prejudice is that his cause has proceeded so far that the defendant is in a
position to demand on the pleadings an opportunity to seek affirmative relief and he
would be prejudiced by being remitted to a separate action." Ex parte Skinner & Eddy
Corp., 265 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1924). Accord, Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936);
Pullman's Palace Car. Co. v. Central Transp. Co., 171 U.S. 138 (x898).
"
1 As originally promulgated, defendant could preclude plaintiff from dismissing
voluntarily under rule 41(a) (x) only by filing an answer. Since a 1946 amendment to
the rules, a motion for summary judgment also prevents later voluntary dismissal. The
reason for this addition was set forth in the Notes of the Advisory Committee on
Rules, App. 28 U.S.C. at 5263 (1958), following rule 41: "Omission of reference to
a motion for summary judgment in the original rule was subject to criticism .... A
motion for summary judgment may be forthcoming prior to answer. Since a motion
may require even more research and preparation than the answer itself, there is good
reason why the service of motion, like that of answer, should prevent a voluntary
dismissal by the adversary without court approval."
[Vol. 1962: 285
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This rule permits plaintiff to dismiss voluntarily, but prevents abuse- of
that right by restricting its exercise to. an early stage in the proceedings.1
2
Although early decisions arising under rule 41(a)(i) interpreted
answer to mean appearance,' the federal courts subsequently rejected
this view and adopted a narrow interpretation of answer and motion for
summary judgment.' A plaintiff generally has been refused voluntary
dismissal only after the defendant has served a formal answer which
complies with the requirements of rule 7,15 or has made motion for
summary judgment under rule 56.16 For example, federal courts
have held that a plaintiff was not deprived of his right to dismiss volun-
12 See 5 MooRE, FEDER. PRAcricE oo 7 (2d ed. 1950). In states which allow
voluntary dismissal at a late stage in the proceeding, a plaintiff may bring suit repeatedly,
imposing hardship on defendant and court. McCann v. Bently Stores Corp., 3t F. Supp.
234 (W.D. Mo. 1940). See Note, z6 TExAs L. REv. 9, (1947) for examples of
abuses under such a state procedure. The purpose of rule 41 was to prevent such
abuses in the federal courts.
"a See, e.g., Love v. Silas Mason Co., 66 F. Supp. 753 (W.D. La. 1946) (prior
to the 1946 amendment, plaintiff prevented from voluntarily dismissing by filing of
motion for summary judgment, which court deemed constituted an appearance).
'This approach to rule 41 is illustrated by the oft-quoted opinion in Wilson
v. Fremont Cake and Meal Co., 83 F. Supp. 9oo, 904, 905 (D. Neb. 1949): "The
employment of the term answer in rule 41 (a) (s) cannot be assigned to inadvertance....
It signifies an answer as that expression is used in the rules, and thus used, it does not
include a motion. . . . [Ylet, it [the Supreme Court] saw fit to bracket one type of
motion only with an answer in defining the pleadings whose service should thereafter
prevent the plaintiff's dismissal at will of his action."
It is interesting to note that the court in the instant case was in accord with Wilson
in its first memorandum: "It is obvious that a literal reading of the rule compels the
conclusion that the plaintiff dd succeed in dismissing this suit, since the notice of dis-
missal was filed before the defendant served an answer or a motion for summary
judgment .... Although we are in sympathy with the defendant's position, we think
... that we are not free to rewrite the provisions of rule 41." Tele-Views News Co.
v. S.R.B. TV Publishing Co., 28 F.R.D. 303, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
" FED. R. CIv. P. 7(a) "Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer....
See Forms 2o and 21 in AP.P. OF FoRsS, FED. R. Civ. P. See generally a MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1501-1510 (2d ed. 195o). The court in Winslow v. National
Electric Products Corp., 5 F.R.D. 126, 131 (W.D. Pa. 1946) indicated the requirements
for an answer: "Although there is no need for the defendant to set forth any evidence
or to expose its defense in detail, an answer does require, however, a statement of such
definite material that the plaintiffs will be informed of the defense they must be pre-
pared to meet."
In Butler v. Denton, iSo F.zd 687 (zoth Cir. 1945), the court took a position
opposed to Wilson" v. Fremont Cake and Meal Co., supra n.14, and held that a petition
for intervention by the Government prevented the plaintiff from dismissing as of right.
The court reasoned thai the petition for intervention had raised justiciable issues.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
Vaol. %96z: z85]
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tarily after a motion for change of venue,17 a motion challenging the
court's jurisdiction,28 a motion for stay pending arbitration, 19 or a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.2
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit abandoned a narrow
interpretation of answer under rule 41(a)(i) in Harvey Aluminum,
Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.21 in denying voluntary dismissal after
the merits of the controversy had been considered upon hearing for a
preliminary injunction. While admitting that notice of voluntary dis-
missal had been filed prior to answer or motion for summary judgment,
the court held that the essential purpose of the rule would be defeated
by its literal application to the case at bar.
The court in Tele-Views News Co. v. S.R.B. TV Publishing Co."
took an approach similar to that of the Second Circuit and held that
plaintiff could not dismiss voluntarily after the court had an opportunity
to make a final determination of the entire action. Defendant's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim was accompanied by supporting
affidavits, and according to the court, the district court in Illinois could
have treated this as a motion for summary judgment by operation of
rule 12(b)(6).2 If this were the sole ground for the decision, the
holding would not represent a departure from previous cases. How-
ever, the court stated that even if viewed as a genuine motion to dismiss,
without supporting affidavits, plaintiff could not dismiss voluntarily after
the motion had been filed. The court observed that a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, like a motion for summary judgment, may
present the court with the opportunity to make a final determination
of the entire controversy. A decision favbrable to defendant of either
motion would be res judicata as to any subsequent suit by plaintiff on
the same set of facts. 24
"'Toulmin v. Industrial Metal Protectives, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 925 (D. Del. x955).
"
8 Kilpatrick v. Texas.& Pac. Ry., x66 F.2d 788 (ad Cir. 1948).
19Rife v. McElwee-Courbis Construction Co., 6 F.R.D. ix (M.D. Pa. x954).
-' Sachs v. Italia Societa Anonima Di Navigazione, 30 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y.
1939). Cf. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Daoust Const. Co., 193 F.2d 659 (7 th Cir. 1952)
(issue was responsive pleading under rule 41 (c)).
21 203 F.2d 1o5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953).
22 28 F.R.D. 303 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
"FED. R. Civ. P. x2(b) If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to
dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule s6,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."
" See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 5o, comment c (942).
[Vol. z96z:28S
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A fear that the right to voluntary dismissal might be used to unfair
advantage by a plaintiff, subjecting a defendant to multiple and ex-
pensive law suits,25 was a strong factor in prompting the courts in
Harvey and Tele-Views News to depart from a literal application of
rule 41(a) (I) 26 If the court in the instant case had felt that plaintiff
were seeking to circumvent the dictates of rule 1,27 it might possibly
have denied plaintiff the right to dismiss voluntarily on the ground of
vexatiousness'
Disregarding any question of vexatiousness, the problem of applying
rule 41(a) (i) to the facts of a particular case remains. One solution
would be to delete rule 41 (a) (i) and retain only the present 41 (a) (2).29
"A plaintiff, under rule 41 (a) (i), is permitted to dismiss voluntarily only once:
"Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits
when filed- by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of
any state action based on or including the same claim." The rule applies, however,
only where the second dismissal is in a United States district court. See Rader v.
Baltimore & Ohio Ry., io8 F.2d 980 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 682 (1940).
After dismissing voluntarily, therefore, a plaintiff may bring at least one more suit
based on the same facts, and in some instances, more than one.
"' In Harvey the court was influenced by the patent unfairness of allowing plaintiff
to dismiss voluntarily after the defendant had expended a large amount of money and
devoted a great deal of time in preparing for trial. See Note, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 616
(1954) Note, 63 YALE L.J. 738 (1954). The court in the instant case indicates that
the same considerations may have influenced its decision. The court recognized that
" .... both the motion for summary judgment and the motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim involve considerable preparation by counsel and study by the court." 28
F.R.D. at 3o8.
", Fan. R. Civ. P. x. "These rules govern the procedure in the United States district
courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, with
the exceptions stated in Rule 8 x. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."
"A court may enjoin plaintiff from bringing additional suits in other forums when
it feels that subsequent actions will be for the purpose of vexing and annoying
defendant. Higgins v. California Prune and Apricot Growers, Inc., 282 Fed. 550 (2d
Cir. x922). Accord, Henjes v. Aetna Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
But because plaintiff may dismiss voluntarily solely to prevent removal by defendant,
Mott v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 2 F.R.D. 523 (N.D. Iowa 1942), the courts
have been reluctant to deny dismissal on the ground of vexatiousness. The dissent in
Littman v. Bache & Co., 252 F.2d 479, 481 (2d Cir. 1958) suggests that vexatiousness
may be a valid ground on which to deny voluntary dismissal. In his dissent Judge
Lumbard said: "the plaintiff presumed upon the court in an attempt to shift his
forum. . .. The District Court has an area of discretion to prevent trifling tactics of
this nature."
"At present, rule 41(a) (2) operates only after the defendant has filed an answer
or a motion for summary judgment. If rule 41(a)(i) were deleted, rule 41(a)
would then read: "By Order of Court. An action shall not be dismissed at the
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This would abolish plaintiff's right to voluntary dismissal and vest in the
presiding judge complete discretion to decide on what terms and condi-
tions plaintiff should be allowed to dismiss."0
Alternatively, rule 41(a) (I) could be changed to conform to the
holdings in Harvey and Tele-Views News, and thus deny voluntary
dismissal after the court has had an opportunity to consider the merits
of the controversy. The substitution of this criterion for the present
standard under rule 41 (a) (I) would necessarily vest a measure of dis-
cretion in the presiding judge, but would not abolish completely the
plaintiff's right of voluntary dismissal. Moreover, the suggested re-
vision would set forth the true criterion by which the courts in recent
cases have interpreted the rule. Such a revision would provide more
certain notice to litigants of when plaintiff may dismiss his action and
would have the additional advantage of more nearly achieving the
purpose for which rule 41 (a) (i) originally was promulgated.
plaintiff's instance save upon order of court and upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to
service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed
against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dis-
missal under this paragraph is without prejudice." This solution is suggested in Note,
63 YALE L.J. 738 (zqs9).
O In applying rule 41(a) (2) the courts tend to allow dismissal without prejudice
if the adverse party can be made reasonably whole by the imposition of terms and condi-
tions. This generally can be done by requiring plaintiff to reimburse defendant for all
reasonable costs in preparing for trial. See Mott v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 2
F.R.D. 523 (N.D. Iowa 1942); McCann v. Bently Stores Corp., 32 F. Supp. 234
(W.D. Mo. 1940).
[Vol. x.962: 28S
